Abstract. In studies of social dynamics, cohesion refers to a group's tendency to stay in unity, which -as argued in sociometry -arises from the network topology of interpersonal ties between members of the group. We follow this idea and propose a game-based model of cohesion that not only relies on the social network, but also reflects individuals' social needs. In particular, our model is a type of cooperative games where players may gain popularity by strategically forming groups. A group is socially cohesive if the grand coalition is core stable. We study social cohesion in some special types of graphs and draw a link between social cohesion and the classical notion of structural cohesion [34] . We then focus on the problem of deciding whether a given social network is socially cohesive and show that this problem is CoNP-complete. Nevertheless, we give two efficient heuristics for coalition structures where players enjoy high popularity and experimentally evaluate their performances.
Introduction
Human has a natural desire to bind with others and needs to belong to groups. By understanding the basic instruments that generate coherent social groups, one can explain important phenomena such as the emergence of norms, group conformity, self-identity and social classes [12, 1, 19, 18] . For example, studies reveal that on arrival to Western countries, immigrants tend to form cohesive groups among relatives and acquaintances in their ethnic communities, which may hamper their acculturation into the new society [28] . Another study identifies cohesive groups of inhabitants in an Austrian village that correspond to stratified classes defined by succession to farmland ownership [4] .
A social group arises when members of the groups are linked and develop bonds. Cohesion refers to a tendency for a group to stay in unity, which is considered from two traditional -and seemingly opposing -views: Firstly, group cohesion refers to a "pulling force" that draws members together [12] ; Secondly, cohesion can also refer to a type of "resistance" of the group to disruption [17] . A common ground from both views is that cohesion amounts to a complex process characterised by both the micro-focus of psychology (fulfilment of personal objectives and needs), and the macro-focus of sociology (emergence of social classes) [5] . A challenge is therefore to build a general but rigorous model to bridge the micro-and the macro-foci.
Most theories of group dynamics rely on two fundamental drives: tasks, and social needs. Indeed, every group exists to accomplish a certain task; cooperation is desirable because combining skills and resources leads to a better collective outcome. Based solely on this drive, cohesion becomes an issue of economics: how collective gains can be distributed among members to satisfy each member's goals. The theory of cooperative games tries to answer this question by assuming people as rational players who arrive at a stable outcome, i.e., a coalition formation where every coalition finds a stable division of the collective goods [3] . Social need is another important factor of group dynamics. A society embodies complex social relations such as friendship and trust. The theory of self categorization asserts that individuals mentally associate themselves into groups based on such traits [18] . Taking social relations into account, White and Harary describe cohesion as a network property and define structural cohesion [34] ; through this notion they prove that the two seemingly opposing views of cohesion (pulling force versus resistance to disruption) are in fact equivalent. Their work is then followed by intensive effort on community detection in the last 10-15 years [10, 13] .
We identify insufficiencies in the existing mathematical models for social cohesion: 1) Cooperative game is a general framework on the economic process of resource allocation. While cohesion may imply stability, cooperative games often do not capture cohesion, as they miss the crucial social network dimension. 2) Structural cohesion of a network refers to the minimum number of nodes whose removal results in network disintegration [34] ; this is a property of the network on the whole, and does not embody individual needs. Hence it fails to link the macro-with the micro-focus of group dynamics.
In this paper, we define cooperative games on social networks whose nodes are rational players. Outcomes of the game not only rely on the network of social relations, but also reflect individuals' social needs. Our model is consistent with the following theories: Firstly, we follow the network approach to study social phenomena, which is started by early pioneers such as Simmel and Dirkheim [11, 35] . Secondly, our gametheoretic formulation is in line with theories in group dynamics that focus on the interdependence of group members [23] . Thirdly, we rigorously verify that networks with high structural cohesion also tend to be socially cohesive according to our definition.
To define payoffs, we adopt the following intuition: People prefer to be in a group where they are seen as valuable and influential members. Thus, the payoff of players in a sub-network should reflect in some sense social positions. Social position is a multidimensional concept affected by a range of factors from behavioural and cognitive traits to structural and positional properties. Here we focus on the positional properties and follow the sociometric view that popularity -an important indicator of social positionarises from interpersonal ties such as liking or attraction among people [20] ; a person is popular if she is liked by a large portion of other people. In particular, the authors of [9] adopt the degrees of nodes, i.e., the numbers of edges attached to nodes, as a measure of popularity and identify economical benefits for a person to become popular. Hence in our games, we define the payoffs of players based on their degrees.
We now summarise the main contributions of the paper: (1) We propose popularity games on a social network and present a game-based notion of social cohesion, which refers to the situation when the grand coalition is core stable, a well-known stability concept. (2) To justify our model, we show consistency between popularity games and intuition over several special classes of networks. We also build a natural connection between structural cohesion and our notion of social cohesion (Theorem 19). (3) We prove that deciding whether a network is socially cohesive is computationally hard (Theorem 27) (4) Finally, we present two heuristics that decide social cohesion and compute group structures with high player payoffs and evaluate them by experiments.
Related works. The series of works [27, 26, 30, 32, 31] investigates game-based network centrality. Their aim is to capture a player's centrality using various instances of semivalues, which are based on the player's expected payoff. In contrast, our study aims at games where the payoff of players are given a priori by degree centrality and focus on core stability. [7] uses non-cooperative games to explain community formation in a social network. Each player in their game decides among a fixed set of strategies (i.e. a given set coalitions); the payoff is defined based on gain and loss which depend on the local graph structures. [25] studies community formation through cooperative games. The payoffs of players are given by modularity and modularity-maximising partitions correspond to Nash equilibria. The focus is on community detection but not on social cohesion. Furthermore, our payoff function is not additively separable and hence does not extends from their model. Lastly, our work is different from community detection [13] . The notion of community structure originates from physics which focuses on a macro view of the network, while our work is motivated from group dynamics and focus on individual needs and preferences.
Paper organisation. Section 2 presents the game model and discusses notions of popularity and social cohesion. Section 3 looks at several standard graph classes and characterizes core stability in each class. Section 4 links structural cohesion with our game-based social cohesion. Section 5 proves that deciding social cohesion of a given network is CoNP-complete. Section 6 relaxes social cohesion to a notion of social rationality and through experiments, this section connects this notion with community structures. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses future work.
Popularity Games and Social Cohesion
Network and games. A social network is an unweighted graph G = (V, E) where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of (undirected) edges. An edge {u, v} ⊆ V (where u = v), denoted by uv, represents certain social relation between u, v, such as attraction, interdependence and friendship. We do not allow loops of the form uu. If uv ∈ E, we say that u, v are adjacent. A path from a node u to a node v is a finite sequence of nodes u = u 1 u 2 . . . u n = v where u i u i+1 ∈ E for all 1 ≤ i < n. The network is connected if a path exists between any pairs of nodes. Let G = (V, E) be a social network. We define a cooperative game on G where each node in V is a rational player. The reader is referred to [29] for more details on cooperative game theory.
Definition 1.
A cooperative game (with non-transferrable utility) is a pair G = (V, ρ) where V is a set of players, and ρ :
The grand coalition formation is W G = {V } where V is called the grand coalition. Cooperative games describe situations where players strategically build coalitions based on individual payoffs. A predicted outcome of the game is a stable coalition formation in the sense that no set of players have the incentive to "disrupt" the formation by binding into a new coalition. More precisely, let (V, ρ) be a cooperative game. Take a coalition formation W and set ρ W (u) := ρ(u, S) where u ∈ S and S ∈ W.
Definition 2. A non-empty set of players H ⊆ V is blocking for W if ∀u ∈ H : ρ(u, H) > ρ W (u); In this case we say that W is blocked by H.
In other words, if S blocks W, then every u ∈ S will get a higher payoff if they join S.
Popularity. Social positions, as argued in sociometric studies, arise from the network topology [8] . A long line of research studies how different centralities (e.g. degree, closeness, betweenness, etc.) give rise to "positional advantage" of individuals. In particular, degree centrality refers to the number of edges attached to a node. Despite its conceptual simplicity, degree centrality naturally represents (sociometric) popularity, which plays a crucial role in a person's self-efficacy and social needs [37, 9] . Popularity depends on the underlying group: a person may be very popular in one group while being unknown to another. Hence individuals may gain popularity by forming groups strategically. We thus make our next definition. The sub-network induced on a set
Note that p {u} (u) = 0 for every node u. If u ∈ S has an edge to all other nodes in the graph G S, then u is the most popular node in S with p S (u) = (|S| − 1)/|S|. The popularity of any player is in the range [0, 1).
An outcome of the popularity game Γ (G) assigns any player u with a coalition S u. The sum of popularity of members of S equals their average degree in S, i.e.
The average degree measures the density of the set S, which reflects the amount of interactions within S, and thus can be regarded as a collective utility. In this sense, the popularity game is efficient in distributing such collective utility among players according to their popularity.
Social cohesion. Social cohesion represents a group's tendency to remain united in satisfying members' social needs [6] . We express cohesion through core stability w.r.t. the popularity game Γ (G): Suppose a coalition formation W is not core stable. Then there is a set S ⊆ V every member of which would gain a higher popularity in S than in their own coalitions in W. Thus there is a latent incentive among members of S to disrupt W and form a new coalition S. On the contrary, a core stable W represents a state of the network that is resilience to such "disruptions". Thus, when the grand coalition formation W G = {V } is core stable, all members bind naturally and harmoniously into a single group and would remain so as long as the network topology does not change. Definition 6. A network G = (V, E) is socially cohesive (or simply cohesive) if the grand coalition formation W G is core stable w.r.t. the popularity game Γ (G). Example 1. Fig. 1(a) displays a network G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 ) . The popularity p V (i) is 1/3 if i = b, f , and the popularity is 1/2 if i = a, c, d, e. The set {a, b, c} blocks W G1 as each member has popularity 2/3. The only core stable formation is {{a, b, c}, {d, e, f }}. Adding the edge ad (shown in red) would make G 1 socially cohesive as the popularity of both a, d in V 1 reaches 2/3. Fig. 1(b 
where p V (a) = 4/5 and p V (i) = 1/5 for all i = b, . . . , e. Note that this graph is socially cohesive as the grand coalition structure W G2 is not blocked. However, adding the edge bc (shown in red) will destroy social cohesion as then {b, c} blocks W G2 . Social psychological studies often presume that more ties leads to higher cohesion; this example displays a more complicated picture: Adding an edge may establish cohesion, but may also sabotage cohesion. Theorem 7 (Connectivity). If a coalition formation W of G is core stable then any S ∈ W either consists of a set of isolated nodes, or induces a connected subgraph.
Proof. Suppose that S is not a set of isolated nodes, and that S = V 1 ∪ V 2 where V 1 , V 2 are non-empty and no edge exists between any pair in V 1 × V 2 . Take a node u ∈ S with non-zero degree, and say, without loss of generality, that u ∈ V 1 . Then
Hence W does not contain S.
Theorem 7 states that any two nodes (that are not isolated nodes themselves) not connected by a path have no incentive to be in the same coalition. Hence it is sufficient to only consider coalitions that induce connected sub-networks of a social network.
Definition 8.
A set S ⊆ V is called a social group of G if S induces a connected sub-network. A group structure is a coalition formation containing only social groups.
The next theorem shows that social cohesion is inherently a small group property, i.e., socially cohesive networks have bounded size.
Theorem 9. Let δ(G) be the maximum degree of nodes in G = (V, E). Then G is socially cohesive only when |V | ≤ 2δ(G) unless |V | = 1.
Proof. Suppose |V | > 2δ(G) and |V | > 1. If E = ∅, G is not socially cohesive by Theorem 7. Otherwise, pick an edge uv. Then max{deg(u), deg(v)} ≤ δ(G) < |V |/2. This means that max{p V (u), p V (v)} < 1/2, and the edge {u, v} forms a blocking set. Thus G is not socially cohesive.
Social Cohesion in Special Classes of Graphs
We now investigate our games on some standard classes of graphs and characterize core stable group structures.
Complete networks. A graph G = (V, E) is complete if an edge exists between any pair of nodes. It corresponds to the tightest social structure where all members mutually interact. Naturally, one would expect a complete network to be socially cohesive.
Theorem 10. Let G = (V, E) be a complete network. The grand coalition is the only core stable group structure. Hence G is socially cohesive.
Proof. Any induced sub-network G S of a complete network G = (V, E) (where S ⊆ V ) is also complete. Thus
Therefore any player's popularity is maximised in the grand coalition V .
Star networks.
A star network contains a node c (centre), a number of other nodes u 1 , . . . , u m (tails) where m > 1, and edges {cu 1 , . . . , cu m }. Intuitively, the centre c would like to be in a social group with as many players as possible, while a tail would like to be with as few others as possible.
Theorem 11. A group structure W of a star network is core stable if and only if the centre is in the same social group with at least half of the tails. Thus, any star network is socially cohesive.
Proof. Take any group structure W and suppose the centre c is in a social group S with tails. Then p S (c) = /( + 1) and for any tail u i ∈ S, p S (u i ) = 1/( + 1). All players not in S has popularity 0 as their social groups contain only one node.
for some tail v. In either case S does not block W. Hence W is core stable. -Suppose < m/2. Then let N be the set of all tails not in S. Then |N | > . Hence the set {c} ∪ N is a blocking set for W as p {c}∪N (c) > p S (c).
Thus W is core stable if and only if ≥ m/2.
Complete Bipartite Graph. A complete bipartite graph K n,n consists of disjoint sets of nodes V 1 , V 2 with n nodes each and E = {uv | u ∈ V 1 , v ∈ V 2 } (where m, n = 0). Let W be a group structure. For every S ∈ W, we use (S) and r(S) to denote |{v | v ∈ S ∩ V 1 }| and |{v | v ∈ S ∩ V 2 }|, respectively.
Lemma 12. W is core stable only if ∀S ∈ W : (S) ≥ r(S).
Proof. Suppose there is S ∈ W with (S) < r(S). Since m ≥ n, there is H ∈ W with (H) > r(H). Take any u ∈ S ∩ V 2 and v ∈ H ∩ V 1 . Then we have
, and
Hence, the set {u, v} blocks W as p {u,v} (u) = p {u,v} (v) = 1/2.
We next characterize core stable group structure in K n,n . In particular, perfect matchings, i.e., situations when every v ∈ V 1 is matched with a unique player in V 2 , are core stable.
Theorem 13. A group structure W of K n,n is core stable if and only if ∀S ∈ W : (S) = r(S).
Proof. By Lemma 12, if W is core stable then ∀S ∈ W : (S) = r(S). Conversely, if ∀S ∈ W : (S) = r(S), then any v has payoff 1/2. Thus W is core stable as every H ⊆ V contains some player with payoff at most 1/2.
We now turn our attention to K m,n with arbitrary m ≥ n ≥ 1 and focus on a special type of group structures: A clan structure W is a group structure that contains at most one non-singleton social group, called the clan; all other social groups contain only single players, called the exiles. The number ι(W) is the number of exiles, i.e., ι(W) = |{S ∈ W | |S| = 1}|. It is clear that any group structure of a star network is a clan structure. Theorem 11 then becomes a special case (when n = 1) of the next theorem, which characterizes core stable clans structures of K m,n . Theorem 14. For any m ≥ n > 0, a clan structure W of K m,n is core stable if and only if the clan S contains all nodes in V 2 and (S) ≥ max{n, ι(W)·n}. Thus, K m,n is socially cohesive.
Proof. Suppose W is a core stable clan structure. Lemma 12 implies that the clan S contains all nodes in V 2 and (S)≥n. If (S)<ι(W)·n, (ι(W)+1) (S)<ι(W)( (S)+n) and thus (S) (S)+n < ι(W) ι(W)+1 . Then the set {v} ∪ X blocks W where v ∈ S ∩ V 2 and X is the set of exiles in G. Hence we must have (S) ≥ max{n, ι(W) · n}.
Conversely, suppose V 2 ⊆ S and (S) ≥ max{n, ι(W)n}. Assume for a contradiction that H blocks W. Then for any
This means that H must contain a player u ∈ V 1 that belongs to S, and we must have
Contradiction. Thus W is core stable.
Structural Cohesion and Social Cohesion
White and Harary in [34] describe group cohesion using graph connectivity.
Definition 15 (White and Harary [34] ). Let G be a connected graph. The structural cohesion κ of a connected graph G is the minimal number of nodes upon removal of which G become disconnected.
As stated in [34] , a larger κ implies that G is more resilient to conflicts or the departure of group members, and is thus more cohesive. Moreover, Menger's theorem states that κ is the greatest lower bound on the number of paths between any pairs of nodes. Hence κ is a reasonable measure of cohesion. We next link κ with our notion of social cohesion. In [16] , a pair uv / ∈ E is seen as a type of "structural hole" that forbids communication and is thus referred to as an absent tie. For each S ⊆ V and u ∈ S we define the following:
1. f in (u, S) := deg S (u) is the number of actual ties of u within the group S, 2. f out (u, S) := |{v / ∈ S | uv ∈ E}| is the number of actual ties of u outside S, 3. s in (u, S) := |S| − f in (u, S) is the number of absent ties (including u itself) in S, and 4. s out (u, S) := |{v / ∈ S | uv / ∈ E}| is the number of absent ties outside S.
These variables give rise to a characterization of social cohesion. Intuitively, if S ⊆ V is a blocking set, each member u tends to have many actual ties within S and absent ties outside S, i.e., high f in (u, S) and s out (u, S), and u tends to have few absent ties in S and actual ties outside S, i.e., low f out (u, S) and s in (u, S). Thus, we define for all
Lemma 16. For all S ⊆ V , S blocks W G = {V } if and only if ∀u ∈ S : γ(u, S) > 0.
f in (u,S)+s in (u,S) and
The set S blocks W G if and only if ∀u ∈ S : p S (u) > p V (u), which can be shown to be equivalent to f in (u, S) · s out (u, S) > f out (u, S) · s in (u, S) using the above equalities.
A network G contains a minimal cut A 0 ⊆ V of size κ, i.e., removing A 0 from G decomposes the graph into m distinct connected components A 1 , . . . , A m ⊆ V where m ≥ 2, i.e., G contains disjoint sets A 1 , . . . , A m ⊆ V such that each G A i is connected, and for any j = i all paths between G A i and G A j go through A 0 . We further assume that |A 1 | ≤ · · · ≤ |A m | and A 0 is chosen in a way where |A 1 | is as small as possible. Let χ be the size |A 1 |, and let µ be the largest possible length m of the sequence of A i 's. We first look at the case when κ = 1.
Lemma 17. If κ = 1 and G is socially cohesive, then χ < 2.
Proof. Suppose κ = 1 and χ ≥ 2. Let (A 1 , . . . , A m ) be an optimal cut sequence. Take u ∈ A 1 . As G contains a cut node, f out (u, A 1 ) ≤ 1 and s out (u,
Since |V | − χ>χ, γ(u, A 1 )>0. Thus by Lemma 16, A 1 blocks the grand coalition W G .
We now generalize Lemma 17 to graphs with higher structural cohesion. Proof. Suppose µ > 2. Take an optimal cut sequence (A 1 , ..., A µ ) and u ∈ V 1 . Since deg(u) < χ + κ and |V | ≥ µχ + κ, we have
. Thus any edge {u, v} in G V 1 forms a blocking set of the grand coalition formation W G .
Lemma 18 can be used as a (semi-)test for social cohesion when µ > 2: whenever χ exceeds κ µ−2 , G is not socially cohesive. Clearly, more graphs become socially cohesive as κ gets larger. Summarizing Lemma 17 and Lemma 18, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 19. Let G be a network.
-If κ = 1, then G is not socially cohesive as long as χ ≥ 2.
-If κ > 1 and µ > 2, then G is not socially cohesive as long as χ ≥ κ µ−2 Remark 20. The only case left unexplained is when κ > 1 and µ = 2. In this case there exist graphs with arbitrarily large χ but are socially cohesive.
We focus on the computational problem of deciding if a network is socially cohesive. More precisely, We are interested in the decision problem COH:
Instead of considering networks in general, we restrict our attention to a special type of networks. The distance between two nodes u and v, denoted by dist(u, v), is the length of a shortest path from u to v in G. The eccentricity of u is ecc(u) = max v∈V dist(u, v). The diameter of the network G is diam(G) = max u∈V ecc(u).
We use NDU 2 to denote the set of all non-diametrically uniform connected graphs whose diameter is at most 2. Our goal is to show that the COH problem is computationally hard already on the class NDU 2 . The following is a characterization theorem for NDU 2 graphs.
Theorem 22. The network G belongs to NDU 2 if and only if its nodes V can be partitioned into two non-empty set V 1 and V 2 , where
Proof. Since G has diameter 2 and is not diametrically uniform, there is a non-empty set V 1 of nodes with eccentricity 1, and the other nodes (call them V 2 ) have eccentricity 2. The sets V 1 , V 2 satisfy the condition in the theorem.
Let G be a graph in NDU 2 . We call {V 1 , V 2 } as described in Theorem 22 the eccentricity partition of G. We first present some simple properties of NDU 2 .
Lemma 23. The network G in NDU 2 is socially cohesive if and only if no set S ⊆ V 2 blocks W G .
Proof. One direction (left to right) is clear. Conversely, suppose the network is not socially cohesive. Let S ⊂ V be a blocking set of the grand coalition formation, i.e., ∀u∈S :
|S| ≥ p S (u) which contradicts that fact that S is a blocking set. By the lemma above, the structure of G V 2 is crucial in determining social cohesion of G. For any S ⊆ V 2 and u ∈ S, we recall the notions f in (u, S), f out (u, S), s in (u, S), and s out (u, S) from Section 4, but re-interpret these values within the sub-network G V 2 . Hence, we now set f out (u, S) as |{v ∈ V 2 \ S | uv ∈ E}|, i.e., the number of ties that u has within V 2 but not in S, the other variables remain as originally defined. Thus
We then define the value
Theorem 28. The problem COH is CoNP-complete. Furthermore CoNP-hardness holds already for the class NDU 2 .
Proof. The complement of COH, COH, asks whether a set S blocks the grand coalition W G of a given network G; this problem is clearly in NP and thus COH is in CoNP.
Create G by adding k(k−1)+d isolated nodes (and no new edges) to G 3: Let V2 be the set of nodes in G (which contains all nodes in V and new nodes) 4: Create a complete graph with (k−1)(|V2|−k)−d nodes; Let V1 be the set of these nodes 5: Create edges {uv | u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2} to connect V1, V2. The resulting graph is H.
For hardness, we reduce MaxClique (asking whether a graph contains a clique of a given size k) to COH. CoNP-hardness of COH then follows from the NP-hardness of MaxClique [14] .
To this end, we construct, for a given G = (V, E) and k > 2, a graph H ∈ NDU 2 as in Alg. 1. Our goal is to show that H is not socially cohesive if and only if G contains a clique of size k. It is clear that H is a NDU 2 network with eccentricity partition
By definition of V 1 and V 2 , we have
Since k>c and |V 2 |>k(k−1)+d, |V 1 |≥(c−1)(|V 2 |−c). By Theorem 27, H is cohesive.
By Lemma 24, G is not socially cohesive. Therefore, G contains a clique of size k if and only if H is not socially cohesive and the reduction is complete.
Efficient Heuristics
We propose two heuristics that construct group structures of a given network where players enjoy high popularity. These heuristics (partially) solve COH despite COH's inherent complexity: Each heuristic builds a group structure W and checks if any set S ∈ W blocks W G . If G is socially cohesive, then no such S will be found; On the other hand, if a blocking set S is found, G is surely not socially cohesive. Heuristic 1: Louvain's method (LM) We observe that blocking sets of W G are usually tightly connected within, but are sparsely connected with nodes outside. This property corresponds to the well-studied notion of communities [13] . Therefore, the first heuristic uses a well-known community detection algorithm, Louvain's method [2] , to compute a group structure in G. Heuristic 2: Average payoff (AP) The second heuristic aims to optimize the average payoffs of members of a coalition. Socially cohesive networks usually have small diameters (≤ 2). Thus we consider neighborhood N (v) := {v} ∪ {u | uv ∈ E} of players v ∈ V . In Alg. 2, let ν(S) be the average payoff u∈S ρ(u, S)/|S| in any set S ⊆ V . S := N (v) ∩ V such that ∀u ∈ V : νu ≤ νv 5:
W := W ∪ {S} £ Add S to W 6:
V := V \ S 7: end while 8: return W Experiments. We evaluate the heuristics on graphs of size n = 5, . . . , 18. For each size, let s be the total number of graphs, b be the number of graphs for which the heuristic finds a blocking set, and c be the number of socially cohesive graphs. The heuristic thus correctly solves COH for b + c graphs. Hence the heuristic has accuracy (b + c)/s. For n = 5, 6, 7, we exhaustively enumerate all connected graphs; LM has accuracy 96.8%, 97.7% and 83.1%, resp., while AP has 85.9%, 68.5% and 69.2%, resp. For each n = 8, . . . , 18, we uniformly randomly sample 10 5 graphs of size n. As shown in Fig. 2(a) , both heuristics achieve high accuracy. As n increases, socially cohesive graphs become increasingly rare. The results show that the heuristics successfully find blocking sets in almost all cases, with AP performs slightly better (100% accuracy for n ≥ 12). We then consider the coalitions constructed by the heuristics. Fig. 2(b) shows that while LM fails to output core stable group structures, AP achieves core stability in 60% of the sampled cases when n ≥ 7. Nevertheless, Fig. 2(c) shows that, compared to the payoffs in the grand coalition, more nodes get a higher payoff in the coalitions identified by LM than in the coalitions identified by AP. Real world networks. We further evaluate the heuristics on 8 real-world networks: karate club ZA [36] , dolphins DO [24] , college football FT [15] , Facebook FB, Enron email network EN [22] , and three physics collaboration networks AS, CM and HE [21] . We only use the largest components in each network; see details in Table. 1. Expectedly, none of these networks are socially cohesive. The box-and-whisker diagrams in Fig. 3 show the distribution of payoffs of players in the grand coalition as well as in the coalitions output by each heuristic (outliers omitted). In all cases, the heuristics improve players' payoffs considerably compared to the grand coalition, while AP in particular achieves higher payoffs. Furthermore, Fig. 4 shows that all nodes get higher payoffs through LM. In summary, both of the heuristics are useful in computing coalitions; while LM may benefit a larger portion of players, AP tends to obtain higher payoffs. 
Conclusion and future work
This paper investigates social cohesion through a type of cooperative games. We show that social cohesion are closely related to structural cohesion and demonstrate that checking social cohesion is computationally hard. We aim to investigate natural gametheoretical and computational questions as future works: Does a core stable group structure exists for every network? What about other stability concepts? What would be strategies of players to improve popularity? The proposed games are instances of a more general framework for network-based cooperative games, where payoffs of players are given by various centrality indices. It is interesting to extend the work by considering other centralities, and different forms of social networks (e.g. directed, weighted, signed). Furthermore, one could also explore the evolution of social groups in a dynamic setting.
